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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impact of information supply and distribution on managerial information
processing using a model derived from the organizational information processing (OIP) framework
developed by Daft and Weick (1984). The model suggests that more supply and distribution of infor-
mation wiltlead to greater information use and the acquisition of more knowledge, given the organiza-
tion's information processing capabilities match its requirements. The model was extended to include
the influence of social factors (i. e., culture and power) and the level of knowledge in the organization.
Product managers in two consumer goods organizations providing different levels of information
technology support were studied to compare the effect of different approaches to supplying and dis-
tributing information. The focused comparison case research method (George and McKeown 1985)
was used, in which sites are selected differing only on the dimensions of interest, namely information
supply and distribution.
The cases provided evidence to support the model. The company which had more data and analytic
tools available for its product managers used more information and knew more about the factors that
influenced the marketing of its products. In addition, organizational culture and the level of knowledge
at the companies affected their approach to information supply, information use, and knowledge
acquisition. The results suggest that the effective use of information technology requires a combina-
tion of managing the organization culture and fitting the characteristics of information supply and
distribution mechanisms to information requirements.
1. INTRODUCTION the factors influencing this balance are complex, and
merely supplying the required information docs not ne-
cessarily insure its use (Feldman and March 1981, Kiesler
One of the major challenges facing the post-industrial and Sproull 1982).
organization is the effective acquisition and distribution of
information in support of managerial decision making
(Huber 1984). Little research, however, has empirically The antecedents of information requirements have been
examined how managers use information in their work. described in Goldstein (1988). This paper empirically
The organizational information processing (OIP) para- examines information capabilities, focusing on the effect
digm provides a framework for such research by pre- of information supply and distribution on OIP. The re-
scribing that information processing (I/P) capabilities search is based on a model of I/P proposed by Daft and
match requirements (Galbraith 1973, Tushman and Nad- Weick (1984), in which information supply is hypothesized
ler 1978) in an effective organization. Capabilities in- to affect information use, which in turn affects knowledge
clude the supply of available information and the mec- acquisition. Information supply and distribution includes
hanisms for its distribution. Information can come from the amount and type of data and analytic tools available
both internal sources (e.g., transaction processing sys- to managers. Information use is defined as the interpre-
tems) or external sources (e.g., third party data vendors). tation and analysis of information. Analysis can be done
Requirements include not only the amount of information by hand or by using analytical support tools such as cal-
needed by managers, but its structure, format, level of culators or computer-based decision support systems.
detail, reliability, and timeliness (Zmud 1978). The OIP Knowledge acquisition is the process of developing in-
framework suggests that capabilities and requirements for sights into the relationship between the organization and
information should somehow be in balance. However, its environment.
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To examine I/P capabilities in a real-world setting, one mation (Weick 1979), and requires enacting or imposing
type of manager, product managers (PMs) at consumer meaning (Weick 1979) or interpretation (Daft and Weick
packaged goods companies, was studied in two organiza- 1984) by communication using rich media (e.g., face-to-
tions, each with a different level of information supply. face rather than written communication) (Daft, Lengel,
An in-depth study of similar functions in different settings and Trevino 1987).
allowed us to isolate and compare the impact of different
approaches to information supply on managerial 1/P, Based on the levels of these variables, an I/P require-
while holding other factors relatively constant. ment is generated. The organization, in turn, provides an
I/P capability to meet this requirement. I/P capability is
Product managers were chosen because their work is in- provided by three primary mechanisms: structure, com-
formation-intensive (McCann 1986), they perform highly munication, and information technology (Galbraith 1973).
similar functions in different companies (Quelch, Farris, Information technology can be useful when high levels of
and Olver 1987) and different approaches to providing complexity, uncertainty, load, or equivocality exist. For
information supply can be found at these companies (Mc- example, complexity can be managed by using decision
Cann 1986). Providing information support for product support systems which allow more variables (e.g., pro-
management is an important issue for MIS managers be- ducts, markets) to be analyzed and related. Uncertainty
cause of the complexity of integrating internal and e,aer- can be reduced by more effectively and quickly delivering
nal information (Swanson 1978), and the importance of the appropriate information where it is needed. Load can
the product management task to the organization. be managed by using information technology to filter,
sort, route, or otherwise organize information for easier
One issue in the study of organizations as I/P systems is use and increased throughput (Hiltz and Turoff 1985).
the consideration of the cost of information acquisition, Equivocality can be reduced when managers use compu-
distribution, and use. That issue, however, is beyond the ter-based systems in combination with face-to-face com-
scope of this research, which focuses on the relationship munications (McKenney 1986).
between information supply, use, and knowledge.
Tichy (1980) suggests two social factors within organiza-
tions which could influence I/P capabilities: culture and
2. RESEARCH MODEL power. Organizational culture affects the supply and use
of information resources by influencing the values and
The OIP framework proposes that organizations face in- attitudes toward information, analysis, (Feldman and
formation requirements generated by their environment, March 1981; Schein 1985), amount and intrusiveness of
organization structure, and tasks (Tushman and Nadler environmental scanning (Daft and Lengel 1986), and at-
1978). These requirements can be characterized by their titude toward risk (Schein 1985). Those in power deter-
level of complexity and load (Driver and Streufert 1969), mine the goals and decision making issues, define which
uncertainty (Daft and Weick 1984; Galbraith 1973), and functions are critical to the organization, control informa-
equivocality or ambiguity (Weick 1979). High levels of tion resources, distribute rewards and incentives, and in-
information complexity can be caused by several factors, terpret or impose meaning on ambiguous goals or events
including having diverse and interrelated product lines (Salancik and Pfeffer 1977)· Thus power influences infor-
and having many competitors. High complexity is man- mation supply. A group's power, influence, and behavior
aged by differentiation or specialization (Driver and also may relate to who controls the larger organizational
Streufert 1969), for example, segmenting a market and unit in which it resides (Aldefer 1987). For example,
assigning a product management specialist to each seg- PMs may have more power and access to information in
ment. Load is the amount of information processed per a company run by marketers than by engineers.
time period. Overload occurs when load exceeds pro-
cessing capacity (Driver and Streufert 1969), and is man-
aged either by reducing input, for example by aggregating
data, or by increasing capacity with more efficient infor- ,
mation exchange (Miller 1977), for example by quantita- INFORMATION SUPPLY INFORMATION
tive rather than verbal reports, where applicable. Uncer- AND DISTRIBUTION REQUIREMENTS
tainty is defined as lack of information (Galbraith 1973), - 1
the inability to predict something (Kahnemann and Tver- INFORMATION USE -- SOCIAL
sky 1982), or volatility (Duncan 1972). High levels of - FACTORS
uncertainty require the capability to gather relevant infor- -
KNOWLEDGE -- KNOWLEDGE
mation in a flexible and timely manner (Poole 1978), in- ACQUISITION , BASE
ferring facts from incomplete information (Isenberg
1986), creating contingent procedures and plans (Gal-
braith 1973; March and Simon 1958) or creating informa-
tion buffers (Kmetz 1984). Equivocality occurs when
there are multiple and conflicting interpretations of infor- Figure 1. Information Supply Model
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We propose an information supply model (Figure 1), de- values or intensity in natural settings (Benbasat, Gold-
rived from the OIP framework, focusing on the organiza- stein, and Mead 1987; Yin 1984).
tion's availability of information, its use of information,
and its acquisition of knowledge. Organizations enact We employed the structured focused comparison method
cycles of information gathering, interpretation, and (George and McKeown 1985). Focus was provided by
learning or knowledge development (Daft and Weick selecting cases which differ on a limited number of
1984). Knowledge plays a critical role in this process. dimensions of interest. The similarities between case
The information available to the organization is both in- sites is discussed in the following section. The primary
terpreted within the context of an existing knowledge differences were in the information technology provided
base, and is added to that base. Knowledge can be fac- to integrate, access, distribute, and analyze data; the fin-
tual, procedural, or causal (Machlup 1980). Interpreta- ancial and human resources allocated to information
tion and analysis combine information representing the analysis; the social influences on I/P within the organiza-
state of the world with existing knowledge to increase tion; and the level of knowledge about markets and pro-
understanding. Information use depends on information ducts.
supply and distribution and its fit to information require-
ments. Culture, power, and the organization's existing To provide structure, the participants in this study were
knowledge base influence information supply, distribution, each interviewed for approximately one hour, guided by a
and use, and knowledge acquisition. scmistructured interview protocol to provide consistency,
yet allow for free response. Eight members of the pro-
Our objectives were to better understand the role of in- duct management organization at the first company and
formation supply, distribution, and use, social influences, six at the second company were interviewed. Their titles
and knowledge within the OIP framework. In the cases ranged from assistant product manager to vice president
presented here, the focus is on information about the en- of marketing. The interview guide is included in Exhibit
vironment (e.g., market share, price/volume relationships, 1. Participants were questioned about their background,
competitor activities, etc.). The information supply model their work, the characteristics of the product/market en-
provides some guidelines for interpreting the differences vironment in which they operated, and their use of infor-
between companies related to different levels of informa- mation. In addition, interviews were conducted with ten
tion supply. Specifically, we propose: information providers at the first company and nine at
the second. The information providers all supplied infor-
Proposition 1: Given a requirement for more infor- mation or technical support for PMs. They included
mation and an organization's capacity to process it, members of the MIS, market research, and trade promo-
an increase in the supply and distribution or infor- tion groups at each company. They were asked about the
mation appropriate to a manager's task will lead to type of information support they provided and about how
greater information use. the PMs used information and analytic tools. Additional
structure and focus was provided by formulating research
Proposition 2: More information use will lead to propositions to guide the data analysis (George and Mc-
greater knowledge acquisition and a larger know- Keown 1985). Participant response data was analyzed
ledge base. using constructs identified in Figure 1. Numbers are used
to identify each participant's quotes, when they are in-
Proposition 3: Information supply, distribution, and cluded in the following sections.
use and knowledge acquisition will be influenced by
the organization's level of existing knowledge.
4. RESEARCH SITES
Proposition 4: Supply, distribution, and use of in-
formation, and knowledge acquisition will be in- Both organizations studied were autonomous divisions of
fluenced by the organization's culture and its distri- different multi-billion dollar packaged consumer goods
bution of power. companies specializing in food products. Each used a
traditional product (or brand) management structure,
with PMs responsible for managing the "health" and per-
3. RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN formance of a specific product and for integrating various
functional areas in support of that product (Quelch,
Because relatively little empirical research exists on or- Farris, and Olver 1987). Supermarkets (also referred to
ganizational information processing, we chose to conduct as the trade or the customer) were the primary wholesale
exploratory qualitative field research. The strength of this customer and retail outlet for both companies.
method lies in its ability to consider complex phenomena
in relevant, real-world settings, to uncover the "hows" and At both companies, product management, market re-
"whys" of complex processes, to provide a "reality check' search, sales and trade promotion analysis were function-
for theories we do not yet understand well, and to ob- ally separate units. Market research monitored and anal-
serve the importance of constructs and the range of yzed trends, designed research and interpreted results,
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and monitored consumer attitudes and usage patterns by aggressive, fast moving, risk taking, and responsive to the
product. The sales force was a primary source of infor- market. Analysis was seen as getting in the way of action.
mation about supermarket pricing and promotion, both Two interviewees commented:
for proprietary and competitor products. Sales promotion
(i. e., coupons, give-aways, etc.) was managed regionally by We want to move fast and not wait for information.
the sales force. They were supported by a trade promo- (6)
tion analysis group, which served as a conduct of informa-
tion from the sales force to the rest of the company. Reliance on information systems can slow a company
down and make it inflexible. If you required that
Internal operations data (orders, sales, production, inven- nothing goes out without research or analysis to back
tory, shipments, product costs, and profitability) were it up, you lose a heck of a lot of time and flexibility.
kept in a mainframe database managed by the MIS de- (13)
partment. External marketing data purchased from third
party vendors was stored in a database on a division-con- In the past, the product management concept had not
trolled minicomputer. It could be reviewed using pre- been considered very successful at Alpha. Many partici-
formatted reports or selectively displayed using a mar- pants expressed ambiguity over the role of marketing in
keting decision support system (MDSS) which also pro- the company:
vided simple file listings and limited computation. (Both
companies used the same MDSS.) Exhibit 2 briefly ex- Top management hasn't figured out what we Iproduct
plains the sources of external data available for purchase. management] should be doing. (7)
Both companies had a liaison group linking product man-
agement and MIS, which helped product managers to If I were a product manager now, I would be con-
retrieve and manipulate information from both minicom- cerned. (15)
puter and mainframe databases.
Information Supply and Distribution. The company was
Product managers in both companies used similar types experiencing both mainframe hardware capacity and MIS
of information for similar analyses: data about share of staffing constraints. End user computing was discouraged
market, gross sales, price, and promotion activity was and formal support for the mainframe fourth generation
used for planning and controlling shard, volume and pro- language had been discontinued. The company owned
motion costs, monitoring product performance and com- thirty personal computers, some of which were available
petitor actions, monitoring inventory levels, and per- for check-out by PMs. However, there was no PC
forming special projects and ad hoc analysis to "explain" training or support, and no PMs had PCS on their desks.
the data. Although data could be down-loaded to a PC, no PMs
knew how to do this. The mainframe systems provided
Both companies were moving from a national to a re- several pre-formatted sales and inventory reports by pro-
gional and local marketing focus and had transferred duct and customer. Additional reports could be re-
some responsibility for promotion and data analysis to the quested, but lead time could range from two months to to
sales force supported by a trade promotions group. over one year. One interviewee described the MIS
Changes in consumer food consumption patterns had af- group:
fects both companies. Each had developed new products
in response to these changes. Like many companies, we have a production-oriented
MIS shop. Just understanding the concept of ad hoc
4.1 Company Alpha data retrieval is a quantum leap for them. (8)
Company Alpha had sales of $300 million. Its oldest pro- SAMI data could be retrieved from the divisional mini-
duet line, which represented 35 percent of sales, was de- computer using the marketing decision support system
clining in volume and had little competition. Its other (MDSS). Use of the MDSS twice per week was consi-
products were facing more competition and were growing dered heavy; many product managers did not use it at all.
in volume. The company was generally a leader in its Most ad hoc analyses were prepared manually. SAMI
markets, however, one important new product was num- did not provide data on competitors' goods that were de-
ber two and was facing stiff competition in an attempt to livered directly to stores. Because many of Alpha's com-
gain market share. Consumer purchasing patterns were peting products were directly delivered, it was difficult to
regional for some products but not for others. Alpha had calculate accurate market share figures for Alpha or for
historically operated in niche markets, creating products its competitors. Product managers obtained information
for those niches and avoiding head-on competition from for these competitors by in-store observation of shelf
larger companies. space and product movement throughout the country.
Social factors. Participants from Company Alpha de- MAJERS data was not purchased because it was consi-
scribed it as entrepreneurial, innovative, action-oriented, dered too expensive. Product managers, however, ex-
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pressed a need for it. Sales force information on compe- The data doesn't give any information about promo-
titive activity was circulated via newsletter, not codified or tion effectiveness at the store level. Did the outlets
stored in an information system. reduce the price like they were supposed to? Did the
promotion spur buying? (5)
Historical information on redemption rates for past pro-
motions had limited use. The data was available on a
national basis, while the promotions were implemented Information Use. The PMs used the available informa-
regionally. Promotional spending data included only ex- tion to carry out performance, promotion, and competitor
penses of the sales force and did not include rebates analyses. They limited their use of quantitative data to
issued directly from corporate to the trade. One PM looking primarily at national trends. SAMI data and
commented: shipment reports were the primary information sources
for tracking performance. Custom reports were used to
Everyone wants to be more market oriented, but no examine key markets (e.g., a market in which Alpha was
one has the tools (data) to do it. So you've got to to introducing a new product). A member of the liaison
a promotional program to see how well it works. (9) group would extract SAMI data for those markets using
the MDSS. If more information was needed, PMs would
The sales force was considered a very important source of usually contact the trade promotion group or sales force
information. A PM noted: for their interpretation of the quantitative data. Since
promotion cost and redemption reports were not accurate
The sales force is our eyes and ears. We have less or timely, PMs relied on the trade promotion group and
factual information about the market compared to sales force for promotion evaluation. Many decisions,
my previous employer. Here, I visit the market more such as changes in product formulation or packaging
and talk to my sales force more. (1) were subjective and made without analysis of quantitative
data.
The data used by PMs at Alpha were not integrated. Product managers commented on their analysis of quan-
Product managers felt that access to data was often com- titative data:
plex and time-consuming. In general, they did not have
access to all of the information they needed: There is not enough time to do analysis. We're a
lean organization and we're ci,nstrained by time. We
There is a lot of information around that I can't get only do [analyze] the big stuff. (6)
to. The MIS group might have some, but it's not
being given to the end user. We could use one per- I'm not comfortable with the computer. It's time
son who knows what is available on the big computer consuming and difficult to use. (10)
and makes it available to us. (9)
There is not a lot of analysis being done right now.
I've never felt that there's a lot of information around We are close to operating totally in the dark. This is
here. If it's available, it's not convenient to get. due in part to limited people resources. It's still bet-
What you have to go through to get it is not worth ter than in the 1960s when just gathering data took
the effort. I have to spend a lot more time gathering all the time. Now it takes one day instead of two
and analyzing information than using it. (10) weeks, but that's still not good enough. (11)
Many times we don't know what information we need
until we get into the analysis. To figure out what the Knowledge. Most participants indicated that their lack of
competition is doing and beat them, the more infor- data and analytic tools limited the amount of knowledge
mation the better. (6) they had or could develop about their products, markets,
competitors, and promotions. Some commented:
Product managers also faulted the currency and level of With more information I'd have a better under-
detail of the available data: standing of may brand. (10)
It takes two months to learn of competitor actions Having more information would raise my comfort
using SAMI data, another month to confirm a trend, level. Now we operate more based on experience
and two months to analyze the data and implement and feel. (6)
action. After five months, the competitor is gone and
it's too late! (5) Here the approach is "if the information is not
actionable, why spend money acquiring it?" We
The information doesn't give me a good enough therefore acquire less information. Much of the in-
sense of regional differences in sales. (5) formation acquired by my previous employer was
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actionable at some future point or was great back- I have more exposure [than at my previous employer]
ground, but was not actionable immediately. (9) to top management and sales, to get their thinking
and viewpoints. I don't have the amount of informa-
We don't have a general and relatively current under- tion that I had before, but I don't know whether in-
standing of purchasing dynamics. We don't know formation would provide the key points to determine
how much cross purchasing there is or the proportion where to go with the brand. (6)
of people who are deal-responsive or brand loyal.
We don't know the demographics of our purchasers
and how they might be changing. (13) 4.2 Company Beta
Company Beta had sales of over $1 billion. The market
The lack of historical information and the inability to re- for its oldest product was stable after several years of de-
Iate outcomes with actions limited the amount of know- cline. The product was extremely price competitive. Its
ledge in some specific areas, such as designing promo- other products were growing and faced less competition.
tions and analyzing competitor behavior. Some PMs The company was the market leader in all of its product
commented: categories. It had two national and several regional com-
petitors. Consumer purchasing and consumption patterns
We're finding it difficult to plan any promotions in differed significantly by region for most of Beta's pro-
many areas of the country. I need to know what the ducts. The cost of raw ingredients was a significant factor
hot buttons are to get people to eat the product. I and strongly influenced product profitability and mar-
need to know what works well, where. There is little keting spending. A recent supply shortage caused the
information to help me figure this out. We're price of Beta's primary ingredient, and thus competition
missing the causal dimension. We've been in the on price, to become quite volatile.
business for a year and the promotions have not been
effective. (9) Social factors. Beta considered itself to be an informa-
tion-driven organization. It embraced the notion of
In developing new promotions, ideally we would look creating competitive advantage from information re-
at previous ones. We don't do enough of it. We sources. It had made several changes to its organization
should go back to SAMI and examine the promotion, within the last few years "to commit to the long term
looking at the numbers before, during and after the growth of the information infrastructure," according to a
promotion to evaluate its effectiveness. (6) senior executive. The marketing and information systems
divisions were combined to "integrate the experts on ex-
I'd like to know how effective promotions are by ternal information (market research) with the experts on
chain, so I can change them next time around, and so internal information (MIS): The company had worked
I can ask the sales force why it didn't work. (9) with third party data vendors to learn how to use the data
they provided.
I'd like to know what works for trade and consumer
promotions, advertising, packaging changes, and Product managers considered the division to be analyti-
shelving changes. (5) cally oriented. They "earned their stripes" by learning to
perform tasks requiring quantitative analysis. Some com-
We are especially lax in knowing the strengths and mented:
weaknesses of competitors' new products and how
they fit into the who buying scenario. How will it We're very fact-oriented and we're very analytical.
affect us? How should we respond? None of that We make our decisions based on facts, combined
analysis tends to be done here. (13) with history and experience. We depend on data.
That's the way we manage our business. (8)
We do not look at the impact of competitors' actions
on our volume and spending. There is no place to There is more confidence in the results if they come
store it on the system and no analytical tools. This is from a computer. (3)
very important for forecasting. It will become more
important as we enter competitive businesses. We Product managers at Beta were considered "the focal
have been isolated from the competition. (15) point of the brand." They had responsibility for setting
volume and share targets and for making marketing deci-
I have a feeling for trade deals but I don't have the sions for their products. However, the sales force was
facts. (5) gaining power and was increasingly being relied on to
analyze marketing information.
One PM commented that the kind of information he had Information Supply and Distribution. Individual training
was different than the type he had in his previous job: about the available data and analytic tools was provided
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by the information systems support group. A minicom- We track competitor promotions all the time because
puter housed both SAMI and MAJERS data, as well as price is such an important part of our business. Pro-
an integrated database which combined and standardized motional spending data for us and the competitors is
SAMI and MAJERS data by geographic areas and time available up to the hour. Things change rapidly. We
periods. Data was kept by product for each of the 52 can evaluate the impact of competitors' actions on
markets, 19 districts, and five regions into which Beta our total spending in minutes and react immediately.
divided the country. Shelf price and promotion data, re- (2)
ported by the sales force, was stored at the account and
market level. Since it was one to two months out-of-date Information use. The PMs used the available informa-
by the time it was put on the computer, PMs keyed the tion to analyze performance, promotion, and competitor
data into their PCs directly from source documents. activity. SAMI reports provided an overview of share and
volume. Most PMs performed additional analysis of the
Every PM was authorized to have a PC. They were used data using their PCs. For example, every assistant PM
constantly by assistants and associates (the "number was responsible for creating and using a spreadsheet mo-
crunchers"), but infrequently by the senior PM staff. All del to track customer inventory and actual versus planned
PMs were trained to use Lotus. Because of the computa- consumption. The model was used to forecast volume
tional limits of the MDSS, Lotus was heavily used. A and share for the next period. Forecasts were supplied to
linear regression package was available, but was used by the production unit and were broken down into local
only a few PMs. Most relied on market research for sta- goals for the sales force.
tistical analysis.
Most PMs used their PCs to track promotions, including
Preformatted market share and volume reports were pro- verifying that the trade offered the proper promotional
duced monthly from SAMI data. PMs used the MDSS price, comparing their price to competitors' prices, and
primarily to extract data and to aggregate information by tracking the impact of the promotion on share and
ad hoc geographic areas and time periods. The systems volume. In addition, many used their PCs to perform ad
group provided assistance for extracting data and struc- hoc analyses and special projects. These included
turing reports. Ad hoc extracts of data from the main- creating models of the effectiveness of features by market
frame could be done overnight on request. Data could or customer, modeling customer inventory levels to insure
be downloaded directly from the minicomputer to the PC. and anticipate adequate supply of product during promo-
This was cumbersome and most PMs extracted and then tions, and analyzing relationships and trends using
rekeyed the data. graphics. PCs were used to track planned versus actual
media spending by market and to monitor the impact of
One member of the information systems support group changes, such as new packaging or product reformulation,
commented on his role: on share and volume. One PM used scanner data to
track market share for the previous week, avoiding the
If I notice that PMs seem to be doing a lot of typing two month SAMI time lag. Another used it to analyze
in of data or that they are using calculators, I'll ques- promotion results at a more detailed level than could be
tion them and maybe I can help them do it on the done using SAMI.
mini. I like to get as much support time in as I can
on a flexible basis. I try to make myself available Some PMs commented on their use of information tech-
based on their time constraints. (10) nology:
Some PMs actively sought additional data sources. Two Now we can do more detailed, accurate and effective
were using scanner data that were purchased for a few analysis, for example, by tracking average shelf price
markets and were being tested by the sales force. Others for us and our competitors in 52 markets rather than
were attempting to integrate mainframe and minicompu- averaging at the level of 19 districts. (3)
ter data, with support from the systems group.
It's easier to aggregate data by specific [ad hoc] geo-
PMs worked closely with market research and considered graphics. (8)
them a high quality source of both quantitative and quali-
tative information. The advertising group and the sales In the past, gathering competitive information took so
force provided less information to the PMs. The trade Iong that it wasn't worth the effort. Now I can sit
promotions group was an important source of quantitative here and talk to you about any business problem with
data about promotions and competitor activity. They all the facts. They come automatically to me at my
tracked planned and actual promotion results by brand, fingertips. I don't have to run around to get the data.
package size, market, district, region, and event. In addi- (8)
tion, they evaluated promotion effectiveness and main-
tained an historical database of previous promotions. Even though my use [of information technology] is
One member of the group commented: fairly limited, I can be more responsive to my
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management, I can pull up stuff and present it in a Right now we're using a lot of judgement in making
usable way. (9) trade-off decisions about whether to spend money in
one market or another. If we could do sensitivity
We can do a lot of "what if' costing, forecasting and analyses on different strength franchises in all of our
budgeting scenarios. (4) markets in different parts of the country, we would
know how to spend our money more effectively.
Use of information technology at senior PM levels was Now we do this only on an exception basis. (2)
limited. One senior manager who did use the technology
saw benefits to its use but potential problems for The PMs felt that the need for more information would
managers not familiar with the technology. He com- be answered by access to point-of-sale scanner data:
mented:
Traditionally we use SAMI data to reflect the ship-
Because I'm a responsible for an entire product ments made from the customer's warehouse to the
group, PIn the only one who thinks about it (as an store. To the extent that SAMI correlates with con-
integrated group). So there are a number of projects sumer purchases it gives us an idea of how much pro-
that you really can't give to an assistant. duct is being consumed. Scanner data represents the
relatively new dimension of what is actually leaving
It's now to the point where this stuff (technology) is the supermarket. The scanner data will tell us on a
very dangerous because all these PMs who don't weekly basis how much we're moving through the
know how to use it don't have access to the basic cash register. This is the closest we can get to the
data. They just cannot get output. At six o'clock in consumer without going into their house. The closer
the morning or at night, they may be the only person we are to the consumer, the easier it is to correlate
around. (9) product movement with consumption. Currently
there is a lot of judgment (rather than analysis) be-
hind spending decisions. We really need that infor-
Knowledge. Company Beta had been actively attempting mation. (2)
to increase the information, knowledge, and skills of its
PMs. For example, it had worked directly with outside Others had mixed feelings about the data and skills
data vendors to better learn how to use the data they required to effectively use scanner data:
provided. Several PMs compared the current information
environment to the one that existed a few years earlier: It could be terrific and it could be a disaster. It
could be a disaster if we treat it the same way as we
Before, we could not easily access historical data. It have treated our data up to now. That would pro-
was easier to use current information, rather than bably reduce effectiveness because we would be so
using someone else's experience to make a better inundated that we would truly lose sight of the forest
decision. Now, I can do it easily. For example, say for the trees. If we can be selective, this can help us
we wanted to lower the price of product X by $1.00 really understand what makes a ... [unit of product]
in a market. If someone told me that we did that move off a shelf, which is what it's all about. It's a
two years ago and it was the best thing we ever did, I whole new level of understanding. But what you have
can quickly look back at the price and share data for to do is to look at that in one place or maybe two
that time period to confirm the results. Now I can places for general conclusions. You must learn your
go into a meeting with some perspective. (8) business from those individual movements and not try
to analyze 50,000 individual movements. We need to
You can correlate more things with the PC. You can learn how the thing works and once we understand
use more information and put it together more effec- that I think it has potential. (9)
tively. (3)
A senior marketing manager had concerns about missing
We certainly have a much better managed database opportunities:
now than we did five years ago, in terms of knowing
things. (9) Product managers are more effective because of
information technology, but the use of those data
One PM, however, felt a need for analyzing more infor- is still the same as it was five years ago. They
mation in greater detail: don't do anything different on the computer than
I did with my old calculator, they just do it faster.
We have a lot of data on promotion spending level There has not been that "great leap forward"
venus volume impact, but what we haven't included from speeding up clerical tasks to really im-
is the customer level results. We need to link custo- proving decision making. We will probably need
mer results to share of market and promotion some other impetus, some creative light to think
spending level. (2) about how we make that leap because it's not
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going to come by itself. It's not going to happen the managers in both companies performed the same
just because they have these PCs sitting in their basic functions using the same types of information. We,
offices. therefore, can test the propositions by comparing the im-
pact of level of information supply and distribution at the
We still do very basic things very poorly. We do two companies, which have similar information require-
very poor trend analysis, very little regression ments. Specifically, we would expect that information use
analysis, very little causal analysis or even non- and knowledge acquisition would be greater at the com-
causal black box trend analysis. We plot the pany with a higher level of information supply and distri-
trends on the graph, and that's about it. A way bution.
in which it could probably become truly more
effective is if we could make good projections of A comparison of the two companies provides evidence to
what is about to happen rather than looking back support the research propositions. In general, PMs at
at what has already happened, somehow use this Company Beta had more data and analytic tools available
data to make a base projection and to build in to them than PMs at Company Alpha. They used more
additional assumptions to make them better. (9) information and acquired more knowledge. In addition,
there is evidence that both cultural differences and dif-
The PM also saw benefits to networking the various ferences in level of knowledge between the companies
levels of the hierarchy to more effectively combine his affected information supply, information use, and know-
knowledge and experience with their analysis: ledge acquisition.
I'd like to do more forward planning, and if I had Information supply and distribution was greater at Beta
electronic access to my assistants' files it would be a than Alpha. Beta had a greater supply of both internal
lot of help. Now it is a pain in the neck to get data, and external data. It received data on retail prices for its
massage them, and build trends into them to project and competitors' products from the sales force; Alpha did
something. The assistants rewrite the databases for not. Only Beta purchased features and scanner data. In
their own purposes, and they would be much more addition, Beta integrated its external information sources,
usable for me than the mini databases. There are facilitating more sophisticated and extensive analysis.
some things I want to be able to look at. They do Alpha, in contrast, had developed and used qualitative
analysis, but after so many years, I could look at sources of information more than Beta, relying primarily
something and probably pick out that there is some- on the sales force and trade promotion group, and per-
thing funny here, something really strange. (9) sonal visits to the field.
Some PMs felt that there was a trade-off to focusing on With respect to information distribution, data were more
quantitative analysis: accessible at Beta and more analytic tools were available.
Alpha discouraged ad hoc access to internal information.
Access to more data allows us to get closer to the Report modifications and requests took months to re-
facts and act faster, but too much detail also en- ceive. Hardware constraints limited direct access to in-
courages short term tactical analysis rather than stra- ternal data. PMs at Alpha felt that information was in-
tegic analysis. People can get caught up in the num- convenient to access or retrieve. PCs were not readily
bers and not look at the strategic issues. (8) accessible at Alpha, nor was training provided in their
use. Beta made a PC available to any PM wanting one.
All junior PMs received individual PC training and
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS created the standard "state-of-the-brand" spreadsheet as
part of their training.
Although the small sample size (N=2) does not allow us
to statistically analyze the propositions, the richness of Information use was greater at Beta than Alpha, pro-
the case data and the detailed description of the process viding evidence to support proposition 1. PMs at Beta
by which each company uses information and analytic used spreadsheet software for several tasks including
tools and produces knowledge provides a basis for testing tracking customer inventory and media spending, bud-
the propositions. Yin (1984) suggests that each case site geting, and forecasting volume and share. They analyzed
should be viewed as an experiment and not as a data the impact of their and competitors' promotions, of new
point. Just as when conducting two experiments, the packaging, and of product reformulations. In addition,
findings from the two sites provide insights which can be they developed models of the impact of features. They
examined to see how well they generalize. tracked price and analyzed promotion data at a market
level.
Both companies had similar market environments and
organizational contexts. Beta had experienced somewhat PMs in Alpha used quantitative data only for an overview
more price competition in one part of its product line, of market activity and did little or no additional pro-
driving the need for promotion information. However, cessing if nothing unusual occurred. They followed up
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with qualitative information from the field if more de- had the skills to analyze the environment. It made
tailed explanation or understanding was required. PMs at greater progress in tying outcomes to actions, thus pro-
Beta also used their information to gain an overview. viding analytical feedback for knowledge advancement.
However, all assistant and associate PMs did more de- Beta was able to leverage its experiences by codifying and
tailed, routine quantitative analysis and many did addi- storing action results and providing access to that mfor-
tional ad hoc analysis. mation. Alpha was less able to provide this support for
learning and knowledge.
The differences between the two companies can be
viewed in the context of information requirements. Beta Perhaps the most important outcome was Beta's develop-
better addressed the complexity of the environment than ment of information and skills for analyzing competition.
Alpha. It supplied information that PMs could more Since Alpha was just beginning to face increasing compe-
easily structure to match the structure of their markets, tition in its markets, it historically had not required this
products, and competition. The greater amount and knowledge. Many participants considered this lack of
timeliness of information provided a better response to knowledge to be Alpha's greatest weakness; information
environmental uncertainty at Beta. Alpha, in contrast, technology support could have its greatest benefit for
was "close to operating totally in the dark" and had a Alpha by providing the means to develop this knowledge.
lower "comfort level". Information overload was not a The implications for management are that learning and
problem for either company. Scanner data could, how- information technology go hand-in-hand. Information
ever, pose problems systems not only supply facts, but allow the company to
for Beta. build a knowledge base, develop analytical skills, and pro-
vide analytical feedback to evaluate actions and increase
Alpha was oriented more toward qualitative information knowledge.
exchange. Beta's infrastructure was geared primarily to-
ward quantitative information processing and exchange. Information technology was most useful in developing
Alpha was operating with somewhat inefficient channels tactical, not strategic, knowledge. Tactical knowledge is
by using qualitative information where quantitative would rooted in unequivocal, quantitative analysis of analyzable
have been more appropriate. However, rich channels information. Strategy is qualitative and equivocal.
might have better supported implementation, thus faci- Alpha's PMs may have had a better strategic feel for
litating action. Beta was operating efficiently with quan- their products and markets, while Beta's may have been
titative information, having defined the world unequivo- better tacticians. Management must recognize the dif-
cally in terms of price, volume, promotion spending, and ference, understand when to promote one versus the
market share. However, PMs might have had a less de- other, and provide the information technology infrastruc-
veloped capability to reduce equivocality, if needed. ture which balances the two.
Product managers at Alpha knew less than their counter- The level of knowledge at each company influenced its
parts at Beta, providing evidence to support proposition approach to information supply, information use, and
2. PMs at Alpha did not know the impact of previous knowledge acquisition, providing evidence to support
promotions and found it difficult to plan promotions in proposition 3. At Alpha, PMs knew less about the fac-
many regions. PMs at Beta, in contrast, examined the tors that affected the marketing of their products. Their
impact of previous promotions and used this knowledge supply, use, and knowledge acquisition focused on
to plan new ones. PMs at Alpha were lacking causal data gathering basic causal information at a national level and
and hence did not know to what degree various factors only focusing on regions on an exception basis. PMs at
influenced sales (e.g., features, coupons, or in-store dis- Beta knew more about the impact of specific marketing
plays). They also knew less about the actions of competi- programs at a detailed geographic level. Their informa-
tors and their impact. tion use focused on building sophisticated models to gain
incremental benefits in profits.
Based on our analysis of the two companies, we propose
that given some degree of fit between information supply There is evidence that a relationship exists between cul-
and distribution, and demand, the greater the amount of ture and the approach company's take to supply infor-
technology and resources allocated to information supply, mation, use information, and acquire knowledge, pro-
distribution, and use, the greater the knowledge about the viding evidence to support proposition 4. One of the
information environment. By greater knowledge, we most striking differences between the companies was
mean more facts and a better understanding of the rela- their respective cultures. Each company's culture fit their
tionships among variables Uaikumar and Bohn 1986). approach to marketing: Alpha responsively creating and
We do not mean to imply that greater knowledge is al- quickly implementing niche products, Beta competing
ways desirable. It must be evaluated within some context. head-on with other major producers frequently on price.
In this case, having greater knowledge would probably At Alpha, the culture was described as action-oriented
increase Alpha's return on marketing investment. Beta and entrepreneurial and less energy was expended on
had much greater knowledge about its environment and it gathering and analyzing information and less emphasis
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was placed on acquiring knowledge. PMs at Beta consi- information to create "causal" marketing models. The
dered the company information-driven. Management technology at Beta was supporting learning. It was sus-
valued data analysis and knowledge acquisition. taining the PM's demand for information at a higher level
of knowledge.
It is difficult, however, to conclude that either the culture
or the level of knowledge was the primary influence on
the approach to I/P. Similarly, it is not clear whether 6. SUMMARY
greater supply and use of quantitative information in Beta
resulted from or was one cause of the cultural difference. Our use of field-based case research has allowed us to
We tentatively conclude that culture, level of knowledge, meaningfully explore a topic about which little is unequi-
and information supply and use represent a self- vocally known. The strength of the method lies in its abi-
reinforcing web of causal links (Weick 1979). lity to help us understand a complex process which takes
place in a real-world setting. Our results provide the
Moving a company to different levels of analytical/factual basis for future research in three areas. First, we are
knowledge poses a challenge for management to break performing additional case research in several sites to
the loop. One potential approach is by managing or learn more about how managers use information. Se-
changing the culture (Schein 1985), another by investing cond, we are performing longitudinal case research in
in new (to the organization) information technologies and some of these sites to determine the impact of increasing
letting the organization experiment and learn (McFarlan the amount of data and analytic tools on knowledge and
and McKenney 1983). Ultimately, management must other outcome variables. Third, we are developing a sur-
make the strategic decision of whether to manage the vey, in which some of the concepts presented here will be
company as an information interpreter (Daft and Weick quantified and the propositions will be empirically
1984) or an action generator (Brunsson 1985), and tested. The case study has been especially valuable in
manage the information infrastructure accordingly. identifying areas in which to focus the quantitative data
collection.
This research identifies a limitation in the OIP frame-
work. According to the framework, fit of I/P require- We proposed a model whereby information use was in-
ments and capabilities is a stationary and attainable ob- fluenced by characteristics of the information supply and
jective. Because the use/knowledge relationship may be distribution, and whereby knowledge increased with in-
reciprocal, rather than causal, fit may become a moving creasing information use. We further proposed that these
target. Use of information is affected by (as well as af- relationships would be subject to the social forces and the
fecting) level of knowledge, and supply and demand are level of knowledge within the organization. Our observa-
not static. On one hand, what we know limits how we tions supported our model. Meeting an organization's
interpret and analyze information, reinforcing existing information needs requires supplying and distributing in-
knowledge (Anderson 1985). The supply of information formation appropriate to the problem and understanding
and the technology to analyze it, if limited to equivocal and managing the culture in which the information tech-
sources, further reinforces the current level of knowledge nology will reside and the level of knowledge within the
(Feldman 1986). On the other hand, knowledge drives organization. Our results further suggest that unequivo-
demand. The more we know, the more we want to know. cal information, analytical use, and analyzable knowledge
Information technology which supplies unequivocal feed- increase tactical but not strategic decision making capa-
back and the tools to analyze it can break the reinforcing bilities. Finally, our results suggested that the notion of
loop and increase knowledge. Greater knowledge al- attainable fit may be a myth, and that once closed
towed Beta to be more directed in defining and meeting learning cycles (Hedberg 1981) are implemented, man-
its information needs. As knowledge increases, more agers must be prepared to manage continual and
variables and relationships are identified and made ex- changing demand for more refined information support.
plicit, and more facts are demanded. As more facts arc
gathered and analyzed, knowledge increases and the 7. REFERENCES
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GUIDELINES FOR PRODUCT MANAGER INTERVIEWS
I. Introduce self and project stressing confidentiality of the study
II. What are the most important tasks that you perform?
A. For each task:
1. Describe it.
2. What information do you use in carrying out the task?
3. Where does the information come from? Probe to find out what information is coming from people
and what is coming from systems.
4. What analytic tools do you use (if any) in performing the task? What tools are used by others to
provide you with the information that you use?
5. What is the impact of having this information on the performance of the task? How would you do the
task differently with less or more information?
III. Are there other ways that you use information or analytic tools in your work? Gather information on the use
of personal computers, PC software, mainframe computers and software, electronic mail, etc.
IV. Is there other information that you receive from others that you use in your work?
V. What factors influence your use of IT?
A. What aspects of the company influence your use of IT? What aspects of your division (or business unit)?
What aspects of your product? What aspects of yourself?
VI. What, if any, changes have occurred in your work due to the increased availability of data and analytic tools?
VII. What, if any, changes do you expect to occur in the next few years?
EXHIBIT 2
PRIMARY THIRD PARTY VENDOR DATA SOURCES USED BY RESEARCH SITES
SAMI: Supermarket warehouse withdrawals (dollars and units) and computed share-of-market by product,
geographic area, and time period. SAMI was bought for a category of products and contained
information for all competitors' products in that category. It was used as a proxy for retail sales.
It includes only warehoused items and, therefore, does not include all goods sold in supermarkets
(e.g., meat sold in the delicatessen section is not in SAMI). Reported monthly approximately four
weeks after the end of the month. Purchased by both companies.
MAJERS: Supermarket promotions (e.g., coupons, give-aways), featured items (c.g., end-of-aisle display), and
advertising type (e.g., newspaper ad size, in-store circular, etc.) by product, account, and time
period. Reported monthly (although company Beta negotiated weekly reports). Purchased only by
Beta.
SCANNER DATA: Actual point-of-sale purchase volume by product, account (customer), and week. Reported weekly
about two weeks after the fact. Limited purchasing by Beta only, for experimentation and one
special project.
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